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The Dutch system of workers’ participation – Jan Cremers (TLS) 
Different forms of workers’ participation
 
This contribution pays attention to the institutionalised involvement systems, based on 
dialogue between representative actors. In the past, I have examined the conditions for a 
fruitful dialogue, at European, at national and at plant level. Some of these conditions are 
related to the power balance in a company - workers must have a say and an opportunity to 
act at the level where decisions are taken and to talk about issues that really do matter for the 
company. Other conditions relate to the ‘positive’ climate for dialogue in a company. 
Research, dedicated to the quality and impact of the work of works councils, reveals that the 
stability of the partnership, the fact that workers’ input is taken serious and the tradition of 
consent seeking all contribute to more stable industrial relations at plant level.1 Mutual trust 
and mutual respect, even when positions are diverging, make it possible for management 
and labour to enter into conflicts, whilst at the same time, the cooperation in other areas 
continues. It is possible to find some evidence that the stable and structured forms of 
workers’ involvement and dialogue lead to positive labour relations and to better company 
performance. Thus, the classical HRM-policy of ‘looking after the employees’ is not enough 
and the position of the so-called ‘scientific management’, with workers treated as a 
commodity, is certainly not a fruitful starting point. Workers’ involvement and 
codetermination have to be an integral part of the company culture and a cornerstone for the 
changes of the work environment, the work organisation and the overall company policy. For 
this reason, the different ‘hypes’ around types of direct involvement that occasionally pop up, 
often in constituencies (like the Anglo-Saxon countries) that have no stable forms of workers’ 
involvement, are left outside.  
These considerations lead to the question what the role of the legislator is. If dialogue is key 
to come to sustainable and tailor-made partnership, to what extent is it than necessary for 
the legislator to act? Over the years, the Dutch legislator and the social partners have created 
                                                          
1 J. Cremers, Management and worker involvement: cat and mouse or win-win? In The Sustainable Company: a 
new approach to corporate governance, N. Kluge and S. Vitols (eds.), ETUI, Brussels, 2011. And: J. Cremers, The 
learning works council, Transfer 3/08, SAGE.  
the building blocks for a flanking regulatory frame that identifies and recognises the partners 
at company level, provides minimum requirements for the dialogue and promotes the 
negotiations in the shadow of the law. It is not perfect and not transferable, and it has some 
strong and also still some weak points.          
Representation systems in the Netherlands 
a. Trade union work at company level/workplace branches.  
In the development of the workers participation and the workers’ voice in the Netherlands, 
the position of trade union workplace branches has not really been enshrined in the Dutch 
legislation. The present-day situation has been settled in the 1970s. In an important advise of 
the SER (the social-economic council that is the main advisory body for the government), the 
social partners took the position that the legal frame for the trade union work of a workplace 
branch had to be restricted to some general provisions, such as the legal protection of the 
trade union representatives at plant level.2 According to the SER, the very nature of the 
work, the provisions and the size of the facilities for such work had to be addressed by the 
partners in collective bargaining, not by the legislator. The social partners agreed not to work 
towards a formal concertation structure for trade union representatives at company level. 
Over a longer period of time, this resulted in no strict legal frame for trade union work at 
company level.  
In practice, the partners in collective bargaining can agree on how this trade union work is 
structured and financed. A majority of collective agreements provides representatives of 
workplace branches with legal protection and (most often limited) facilities. Some of the 
collectively agreed provisions related to activities of trade union representatives can be made 
generally binding by the Act on collective bargaining (Wet AVV), such as the definition of 
trade union work at company level, the right to nominate trade union contact persons, 
special protection for representatives, participation in collective bargaining, training 
facilities and (paid or unpaid) days off for trade union meetings and conferences. However, 
other provisions that may be agreed collectively, cannot be made generally binding, for 
instance, the entrance of trade union officers, premises and publication facilities, company 
visits or meetings inside the company.   
As a result, the trade unions’ presence at plant level is modest, with the exception of some 
traditional larger plants and companies where workplace branches have been negotiated and 
trade union units were and are active. In most companies, the trade unions have focussed on 
the representative work in the works councils (form b, see below). In general, the works 
councils developed for the unions into the body with the major role and impact. The existing 
trade union workplace branches function often as the backbone of the trade union 
delegations in the work councils. The representatives at this level serve as contact persons, 
provide information on trade union policies, function as ombudsmen and speak on behalf of 
the colleagues in the trade union ranks. A task that became more and more important over 
the years was the participation in collective bargaining processes; from the mid-1990s, 
decentralisation of bargaining became topical.3    
 
                                                          
2 Advies inzake het vakbondswerk in de onderneming (Advice on trade union work at company level), SER, 1977, 
The Hague. https://www.ser.nl/~/media/db_adviezen/1970_1979/1977/b05312.ashx  
3 The Dutch social partners published in 1997 an overview of the tasks that were concluded in the collective 
agreements. The paper formulated considerations and recommendations for the future, including a more 
prominent role in decentralised bargaining. Stichting van de Arbeid (Labour foundation), The Hague, 1997.    
http://www.stvda.nl/~/media/Files/Stvda/Aanbevelingen/1990_1999/1997/19970422.ashx  
b. Works councils 
In the Dutch industrial relations, the main workers’ voice is the works council. Some of the 
characteristics of the work council can be derived from the specific Dutch development of 
capitalism and the welfare state. The nation was for a long time dominated by trade. After 
the late start of industrialisation, the parliament concluded the first labour legislation in 
1875 (the Act against child labour). Two decades later, the first ‘modern’ trade unions were 
established (the diamond workers in 1894, the first national trade union confederation in 
1906). Until the World War II, two types of voluntary workers’ voice were already present in 
some larger companies: the plant councils and the company core group. The plant councils 
controlled the compliance with collectively agreed wages and working conditions, whilst the 
company core group acted as an association of the workers in a company that negotiated 
agreements with the local company leadership. The Dutch Works Council Act (hereafter 
WOR), concluded by the legislator in 1950, combined to a certain extent both fundamental 
objectives. The works council looks after compliance with applicable collective agreements 
and functions as an interest group/representation of the workers in a company. The works 
councils started in the post-war period as a platform for concertation. The reconstruction of 
the country served as the main argument for the search of consensus in the industrial 
relations.4        
The Works Council Act prescribes that every undertaking in the Netherlands with at least 50 
employees is obliged to set up a works council with a range of information and consultation 
rights. In addition, undertakings with between 10 to 50 employees are required, by a request 
of a majority of employees, to set up a personnel representation (PVT). The PVT is a workers’ 
representation with some of the works council competences (this is not treated further in 
this overview). The WOR prescribes that, where several companies belong to a single group, 
a central works council (COR) can be set up. Such a COR is composed of representatives of 
the underlying works councils at plant level or firms. It is also possible to set up an 
intermediate level works council (GOR) where several businesses groups exist in a single 
holding company. From 1995 onwards, the WOR applies also to the public sector.  
Over the last 65 years, the WOR was reformed several times and the workers’ rights and 
competences that can be derived from the Act have grown substantially. The law provides the 
works council with three main types of right: information rights, consultation rights and 
consent rights. In addition, the works council has the right of initiative and competence to 
make proposals to which the employer must respond.5 Moreover, since 1 July 2010, the 
works councils of public limited companies (both listed and unlisted) have the right to voice 
their opinion in the general meeting of shareholders (AGM) on major management decisions 
that have to be approved by the AGM. This right of speech is restricted to decisions with 
major impact, such as mergers, takeovers and divestments, to the appointment and dismissal 
of members of the board of directors and the supervisory board (see below), and to 
remuneration policies. The AGM is not bound to follow the opinion of the works council.6 
The information rights, formulated in articles 31 to 31f, oblige the management to provide 
the works council with information on a range of financial/economic issues including the 
structure and organisation of the company, trends in employment and personnel policy, the 
company's reporting and accounting and the prospects and long-term corporate plans. In 
2006, the legislator added the competence to be informed about the financial compensation 
of the board members (in article 31d).  
                                                          
4 See: J. Cremers, Visie op medezeggenschap, GBIO-Katernen 1, Elsevier, The Hague, 2001. 
5 R. van het Kaar, F. Vink, Inzicht in de Ondernemingsraad 2017, Sdu, The Hague, 2017. 
6 J. Cremers, E. Wolters (eds.) EU and national company law - fixation on attractiveness. ETUI, Brussels, 2011.  
The consultation rights, formulated article 25, relate to economic issues, such as relevant 
restructurings. Consultation is mandatory if the management plans to sell (parts of) the 
company, mergers, take-overs, or substantial changes of the activity or organisation of the 
company. The consultation rights lead to serious delays (up to at least on month) if there is 
disagreement between the management and the works council. An important instrument in 
this regard is the right of appeal. The works council can appeal to the Company Chamber of 
the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam, according to article 26 of the WOR, in case the 
management has neglected the information and consultation duties, or has taken insufficient 
account of the interests of the employees. The Company Chamber has the power to block the 
decision and the planned measures. 
Article 27 of the WOR provides the works council with consent rights. The items listed in this 
article belong to the classical HRM-area, such as consent over pension provisions, working 
time schemes, wage systematic and scaling, reintegration policy, recruitment and other 
personnel policies. If the works council disagrees with the planned measures, after at least 
one consultative meeting between management and works council, the management can ask 
a district court to overrule the council’s position. The court is bound to look at the 
organisational or economic necessity of the planned measures, and to assess whether the 
council’s position is unreasonable. The district court can declare measures taken by the 
management without consent null and void, on the initiative of the works council.   
c. Employee board level representation (BLER) 
The Dutch Civil Code prescribes that larger companies in the Netherlands, defined as firms 
with an issued capital of more than €16 million, at least 100 employees and a works council 
(obligatory for companies with more than 50 employees), have to apply an indirect 
participation of employees at supervisory board level.7   
A closer look at the representation in the board 
a. The structure and composition of the board 
The Dutch corporate governance structure is traditionally based on a dualistic governance 
model (i.e. a two-tier governance structure). Companies with a two-tier governance structure 
divide the management and supervision between two governing company bodies: the 
management board and the supervisory board.8 According to the Civil Code and the Dutch 
corporate governance code, the supervisory board has to supervise the policies carried out by 
the management board and the general affairs of the company and its affiliated enterprises. 
Among other tasks, the supervisory board should focus on the effectiveness of the company’s 
internal risk management and control systems and the integrity and quality of the financial 
reporting. The supervisory board, composed of at least three members, appoints and 
dismisses the management and approves major management decisions. These requirements 
only apply to companies with a majority of employees in the Netherlands. International 
groups with the majority of employees outside the Netherlands are exempted from these 
requirements, although their holding companies for Dutch subsidiaries are covered, be it by 
less stringent arrangements. The composition of the supervisory board has to guarantee that 
the requested and intended expertise, background, competencies and independence are 
present for the board to carry out its duties properly. Each supervisory board member should 
be capable of assessing the broad outline of the overall management. The general meeting of 
                                                          
7 Civil Code, Book 2, article 158.  
8 Since 2013, the choice can be made for a one-tier governance structure in which a single management board, 
comprised of executive and non-executive directors and no supervisory board, functions. In this situation, the 
non-executive directors supervise the executive. Non-executive directors and executive directors have joint 
management responsibility. 
shareholders approves the nominations for supervisory board members. The AGM can reject 
the supervisory board’s nominations but it cannot nominate candidates itself – only the 
supervisory board can do this. If the supervisory board’s nominations are rejected it must 
nominate new candidate(s). The basic principle is that supervisory members are appointed 
for two four-year periods (this can be prolonged). Any subsequent reappointment must be 
accounted for in a report of the supervisory board.9 
The supervisory board’s terms of reference should include a paragraph dealing with its 
relations with the management board, the AGM, the workers’ representation body in the 
company (such as the works council) and the executive committee. The chair of the 
supervisory board has the explicit task to develop proper contacts with the works council. 
New members have to be made familiar with existing workers’ involvement structures.  
The competence to decide on the composition of the supervisory board lies in the hands of 
the AGM. The AGM may pass a resolution to cancel the nomination for the appointment of a 
member of the management board or of the supervisory by an absolute majority of the votes 
cast. Employees, large shareholders, (former) clients or (former) managers of a company are 
excluded from the supervisory board. The main argument is that members of the supervisory 
board may not act as representatives of partial interests, be it the interests of shareholders, 
banks or employees. Members of the supervisory board should act in the interest of the 
company and the undertaking as a whole. A supervisory board member is considered not to 
be independent if, in the five years prior to an appointment, he or she has been an employee 
or member of the management board. 
b. The work’s council right to nominate  
The corporate governance structures in the Netherlands provide the works council in certain 
cases with nominating rights for up to one third of the seats on the supervisory board.10 
Moreover, the works council has the right to be heard by the supervisory board before all 
supervisory board nominations are handed over to an AGM. This creates the possibility to 
exert an influence on the composition of the supervisory board. In order to reach one third of 
the members of the supervisory board, the works council has the right to nominate for every 
other vacancy, until the one-third proportion is reached. This right applies in both national 
company entities (the ‘nv’ and the ‘bv’) that have installed a supervisory board according to 
the statutory two-tier rules of the so-called structure regime. The others conditions are an 
issued capital of more than €16 million, at least 100 employees and an existing works 
council. However, a voluntary application is possible in other companies.  
The works council cannot nominate one of its members. As said before, employees of a 
company or directly in bargaining involved trade union officers are excluded from the 
nomination into the supervisory board. As a consequence, works councils often rely in the 
nomination for the board to candidates that have demonstrated a certain commitment to the 
workers interests (former trade unionists, politicians, industrial relations and human 
resources experts). But another consequence is of course that the board members have some 
distance to the practical daily business and policy issues that the works council is dealing 
with. 
The law dictates that, in principle, the supervisory board accepts the nomination and hands 
it over to the AGM for a final approval. The supervisory board can object to the nomination 
in two cases: the candidate is unqualified for the tasks as a board member or the nomination 
                                                          
9 The revised Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2016, as published by the Corporate Governance Code 
Monitoring Committee, The Hague, 2016. http://www.mccg.nl/?page=4738  
10 Civil Code, Book 2, article 158.5 and 158.6. 
leads to an imbalanced composition of the board. The supervisory board is obliged to discuss 
these objections with the works council, in an effort to reach consensus on the nomination. If 
this fails, the supervisory board has the possibility to appeal to the Company Chamber of the 
Court of Appeal in Amsterdam and ask for the rejection of the nomination. If rejected, the 
works council has the right to come up with another candidate. Objections from the side of 
the works council related to other nominated board members are brought to the attention of 
the AGM, without further impact. The shareholders can reject a nomination by the works 
council that is brought before the AGM by an absolute majority of the votes cast at the 
meeting, provided that at least one third of the capital shares are represented. There is no 
appeal foreseen to a rejection by the AGM in the Civil Code. It is up to the supervisory board 
to start with a new procedure. The legislation permits the supervisory board, the general 
meeting of shareholders and the works council to agree on more far-reaching arrangements, 
although the right of the shareholders to reject a nomination cannot be removed. In some 
companies, the nomination right has been enhanced as a result of collective bargaining or 
more stringent formulations in company statutes.11   
Another influence can be exerted through the formulation of the profile of the board 
member. Nominations must come from the supervisory board in line with a desired profile of 
the composition of the board. The supervisory board has the obligation to discuss this 
supervisory board profile with the works council at the start-up of the board and when 
modifications are formulated.12 This profile contains not only the composition of the board, 
but also the regulation of the nomination by the works council and the requested quality and 
expertise. 
A last provision that has to be mentioned here is the right of the works council to request the 
dismissal of a supervisory board member. The work council can appeal to the Company 
Chamber of the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam and ask for such a dismissal – a right that is 
rarely used. The grounds are the neglecting of the prescribed tasks, significant arguments or 
the structural change of the company that makes a person no longer the right board member.     
The practical experiences with these nomination rights are mixed. Very often the supervisory 
board is composed of five members; with the consequence that only one board member is 
nominated by the works council. Earlier research also suggests that works councils not make 
full use of their nomination rights. The actual total number of employee representatives in 
the board may lay well below 150.13 Van het Kaar gives several reasons for this phenomenon. 
One is resistance by the acting supervisory (and often management) boards; dislike of 
‘strangers’. The boards just go their own way, neglecting (and in a formal sense violating) 
works council rights, or pushing works councils to accept their own preferred candidates 
(sometimes labelling them as having been nominated by the works council). From an 
employee point of view, a second reason seems more important: either works councils are 
not aware of their rights or, more relevant, they consider them as being not very powerful, 
and at least less powerful than their rights deriving from the Works Council Act. In a 
material sense, this may very well be a valid argument: workers and union officials are not 
allowed on boards, board members may not represent specific interests (including worker 
interests), and works councils can only nominate, and not appoint, board members. 
According to van het Kaar, Dutch rights with regard to board level representation are much 
weaker than in for instance in Germany, Austria and Sweden.  
                                                          
11 See for instance the NRC-case, 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:5462  
12 Civil Code, Book 2, article 158.3. 
13 Estimated by R. van het Kaar, in a book on Crossborder mergers (forthcoming).  
c. Changes over the years 
There have been relatively few changes in the corporate governance structure in the past 
decades in the Netherlands. The most important change took place in 2004. In that year the 
Dutch system of board-level representation was altered. The balance of power in so-called 
‘structure regime’ public limited companies shifted from the supervisory board to the general 
meeting of shareholders. One of the main changes was the right of the AGM to appoint and 
dismiss the supervisory board. Before 2004, supervisory board members were co-opted by 
the existing supervisory board. The works council’s right to nominate members of the 
supervisory board was strengthened with an enhanced right that can only be rejected by the 
supervisory board on two well-defined grounds, but their right to effectively oppose the 
nomination of a new supervisory board member was lost. 
Another change took place in 2013 as the choice between a two-tier corporate governance 
structure, with a management and supervisory board, and a monistic structure with a single 
board of directors, was made available to public and private limited companies, including 
those subject to the structure regime. This change did not touch upon the right of works 
council to nominate supervisory board members.  
Final remarks 
Speaking about the Dutch situation leads often to debates, especially among academic 
experts at European level, about functional equivalents. As has been described before, the 
Dutch system is rather standing on its own. The representation in the two-tier supervisory 
board is much weaker than in countries like Germany, Austria, or Sweden. On the other 
hand, is the works council system well-advanced and equipped with rather strong works 
council competences, based on consultation and consent rights on items and policies that are 
often decided in other countries at the level of the supervisory board.   
Trade unions tend to rely on the direct participation in the board in situations of high 
urgency, whilst the daily matters are dealt with in works councils. If the choice has to be 
made between strengthening the position of works council in codetermination and 
broadening the supervisory board towards more workers’ participation, the trade unions 
have so far clearly opted for the first direction.      
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